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Interactions among people or objects are often dynamic in nature and can be represented as a
sequence of networks, each providing a snapshot of the interactions over a brief period of time.
An important task in analyzing such evolving networks is change-point detection, in which we both
identify the times at which the large-scale pattern of interactions changes fundamentally and quantify
how large and what kind of change occurred. Here, we formalize for the first time the network
change-point detection problem within an online probabilistic learning framework and introduce a
method that can reliably solve it. This method combines a generalized hierarchical random graph
model with a Bayesian hypothesis test to quantitatively determine if, when, and precisely how a
change point has occurred. We analyze the detectability of our method using synthetic data with
known change points of different types and magnitudes, and show that this method is more accurate
than several previously used alternatives. Applied to two high-resolution evolving social networks,
this method identifies a sequence of change points that align with known external “shocks” to these
networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networks are frequently used as a general framework
to quantify and analyze the interactions between objects
or people. Network models can be used to better under-
stand the large-scale structure of interactions by identi-
fying clusters of highly interacting communities or func-
tional groups of structurally equivalent nodes. However,
these interactions are often dynamic in nature, and tradi-
tional approaches can overlook the non-stationary struc-
ture of real networks. In these dynamic and temporally
evolving systems we are not only interested in under-
standing the large-scale structure but also identifying if,
when and how it changes in time.
For instance, in social networks, change points may be
the result of normal periodic behavior, as in the weekly
transition from weekdays to weekends. In other cases,
change points may result from the collective anticipa-
tion of or response to external events or system “shocks”.
Detecting such changes in social networks could provide
a better understanding of patterns of social life and an
early detection of social stress caused by, e.g, natural or
man-made disasters.
Here we define the network change-point detection
problem and introduce an online probabilistic learning al-
gorithm for solving it. Identifying a change point requires
inferring a structural “norm” for interactions across a se-
quence of graphs and accurately detecting if, when and
how this norm has shifted at some point in time. To
characterize what kind and how large a change occurred,
we prefer interpretable models of network structure, so
that changes in parameter values have direct meaning
with respect to the network’s large-scale structure. Here,
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FIG. 1: Schematic of a network change point. A sequence of
networks in which vertices divide into two groups at time tc,
represented by a change in an abstract structural index ∆µ.
To detect this change point, we estimate the time of change
t̂c within a sliding window of the last w networks, and call td
the time of detection in which t̂c is found to be statistically
significant.
we take the novel approach of characterizing network
norms via probabilistic distributions over graphs, which
we learn in an online fashion. Identifying the timing and
shape of such change points divides a network’s evolu-
tion into contiguous periods of relative structural stabil-
ity, allowing us to subsequently analyze each period in-
dependently, while also facilitating hypotheses about the
underlying processes shaping the data.
Beyond specialized solutions for change-point detec-
tion in cybersecurity domains [18], many “change-point
detection” methods for networks are in fact solving the
distinct anomaly detection problem of identifying net-
work snapshots that deviate significantly from a station-
ary network norm [4, 14]. In contrast, traditional change-
point detection focuses on the more difficult problem of
identifying significant shifts in the norm itself. Solving
this problem requires distinguishing a statistically signif-
icant change from mere noise, and thus qualitative ap-
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2proaches are likely to be insufficient [6, 24].
Much like traditional online change-point detection
methods for scalar- or vector-valued time series [5], our
approach for the network change-point detection problem
has three components:
1. select a parametric family of probability distribu-
tions appropriate for the data, and a sliding window
size w;
2. infer two versions of the model, one representing a
change of parameters at a particular point in time
within the window, and the one representing the
null hypothesis of no change over the entire win-
dow; and,
3. conduct a statistical hypothesis test to choose
which model, change or no-change, is the better
fit.
Past work on the network change-point detection prob-
lem has typically converted the sequence of networks into
a time series of scalar values and then applied traditional
techniques [19, 23]. Here, we introduce a novel solution
based on generative models of networks, which define
a parametric probability distribution over graphs. Our
particular choice of model is the generalized hierarchical
random graph (GHRG), which compactly models nested
community structure at all scales in a network and pro-
vides an interpretable output for later analysis. Our ap-
proach, however, is entirely general, and the GHRG could
be replaced with another generative network model, e.g.,
stochastic block models [15, 21], hierarchical graph mod-
els [7, 9], or Kronecker product graph model [17]. Finally,
to choose between the change versus no-change models,
we use a Bayesian hypothesis test, with a user-defined
parameter specifying a target false-positive rate.
We then show that this approach quantitatively and
accurately determines if the network norm has changed,
when precisely the norm change occurred, and how the
norm has changed. Specifically, we present a taxonomy
of different types and sizes of network change points and
a quantitative characterization of the difficulty of de-
tecting them using synthetic network data with known
change points. We then test the method on two real,
high-resolution evolving social networks of physical and
digital interactions, showing that it more accurately re-
covers the timing of known significant external events
than comparable techniques.
II. DEFINING A PROBABILITY
DISTRIBUTION OVER NETWORKS
Under a probabilistic approach to change-point de-
tection, we must choose a parametric distribution over
networks. Here, we introduce the generalized hierar-
chical random graph (GHRG) model. This model has
several features that make it attractive for change-point
FIG. 2: A snapshot of the Enron email network from
October 2001 and its corresponding GHRG dendrogram. In
the dendrogram, leaves are vertices in the email network and
the tree gives their nested group structure.
detection and generalizes the popular hierarchical ran-
dom graph (HRG) model [9]. First, the GHRG natu-
rally captures both assortative and disassortative com-
munity structure patterns, models community structure
at all scales in the network, and provides accurate and
interpretable fits to social, biological and ecological net-
works. Second, our generalization relaxes the require-
ment that the dendrogram is a full binary tree, thereby
eliminating the HRG’s non-identifiability and improving
the model’s interpretability for quantifying how a net-
work’s structure varies across a change point. Third,
we use a Bayesian model of connection probabilities that
quantifies our uncertainty about the network’s underly-
ing generative model.
The GHRG models a network G = {V,E} composed
of vertices V and edges E ⊆ {V ×V }. The model decom-
poses the N vertices into a series of nested groups, whose
relationships are represented by a dendrogram T . Ver-
tices in G are leaves of T , and the probability that two
vertices u and v connect in G is given by a parameter pr
located at their lowest common ancestor in T . In the clas-
sic HRG model [9], each tree node in T has exactly two
subtrees, and pr gives the density of connections between
the vertices in the left and right subtrees. As a result,
distinct combinations of dendrograms and probabilities
produce identical distributions over networks, producing
a non-identifiable model. In the GHRG, we eliminate this
possibility by allowing tree nodes to have any number of
children and preferring more compact trees. Figure 2
illustrates the GHRG applied to a network of email com-
munications.
Given tree T and set of connection probabilities {pr},
the GHRG defines a distribution over networks and a
likelihood function
p(G |T, {pr}) =
∏
r
pErr (1− pr)Nr−Er , (1)
where Er is the number of edges between vertices with
common ancestor r andNr is the total number of possible
edges between vertices with common ancestor r:
Nr =
∑
ci<cj∈Cr
|ci||cj | , (2)
3where Cr is the set of direct descendants of r and ci is
the set of network vertices decending from dendrogram
node i.
One approach to setting the connection probability pa-
rameters {pr} would be to choose their values via maxi-
mum likelihood, setting each pˆr = Er /Nr However, this
choice provides little room for uncertainty and is likely to
increase our error rate in change-point detection. Con-
sider the case where exactly zero connections Er = 0, or
equivalently all connections Er = Nr, are observed for a
particular branch r. Under maximum likelihood, we set
pr = 0 or 1. If a subsequent network has, or lacks, even
a single edge whose common ancestor is r, then Er > 0
or Er < 1, and the likelihood given by Eq. (1) drops to
0, an unhelpful outcome.
We mitigate this behavior by assuming Bayesian priors
on the pr values. Now, instead of setting pr to a point
value, we model each pr as a distribution, which quanti-
fies our uncertainty in its value and prevents its expected
value from becoming 0 or 1. For convenience, we employ
a Beta distribution with hyperparameters α = β = 1,
which corresponds to a uniform distribution over the pa-
rameters pr. Because the Beta distribution is conjugate
with the Binomial distribution, we may integrate out
each of the pr parameters analytically
p(G |T, α, β)=
∏
r
Γ(α+β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
Γ(Er+α)Γ(Nr−Er+β)
Γ(Nr+α+β)
.
(3)
By relaxing the binary-tree requirement, the GHRG
produces a spectrum of hierarchical structure (Fig. 3).
On one end of this spectrum, T contains only a single
internal tree node—the root—and every pair of vertices
connects with the same probability pr associated with
it, equivalent to the popular Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph
model. As more tree nodes and their parameters are
added to T , the number of levels of hierarchy increases,
allowing the model to capture more varied large-scale
patterns. In the limit, T is a full binary tree, and we
recover the classic HRG model [9].
III. LEARNING THE MODEL
Fitting the GHRG model to a network requires a
search over all trees on N leaves and the correspond-
ing link probability sets {pr}, which we accomplish using
Bayesian posterior inference and techniques from phylo-
genetic tree reconstruction.
Tree structures are not amenable to classic convex op-
timization techniques, and instead must be searched ex-
plicitly. However, searching over all non-binary trees is
costly. Phylogenetic tree reconstruction faces a similar
problem, which is commonly solved by taking a majority
“consensus” of a set of sampled binary trees [8]. This
consensus procedure selects the set of bipartitions on the
leaves that occur in a majority of the sampled binary
trees, and each such set denotes a unique non-binary tree
containing exactly those divisions. For instance, if every
sampled tree is identical, then each is identical to the
consensus tree; if every sampled tree is a distinct set of
bipartitions, the consensus tree has a single internal node
to which all of the leaf nodes are connected. Thus, we es-
timate T in the GHRG by using a Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) procedure to first sample the posterior
distribution of bipartitions. From this set of sampled bi-
partitions, we derive their non-binary majority consensus
tree (an approach previously outlined in Ref. [9], but not
used to produce a probabilistic model) and assign link
probabilities {pr} to the remaining tree nodes.
Given this formulation, we may update the posterior
distribution over the parameter pr given a sequence of
observed networks {Gt} by updating the hyperparame-
ters as
α˜r = α+
∑
{Gt}
EGtr (4)
β˜r = β +
∑
{Gt}
Nr − EGtr . (5)
Thus, we obtain the posterior hyperparameters from the
sum of the prior pseudocounts of edges and the empir-
ically observed edge counts (number of present and ab-
sent connections). This Bayesian approach produces an
implicit regularization. As the number of observations
Nr increases, the posterior distribution becomes increas-
ingly peaked, reflecting a decrease in parameter uncer-
tainty. In the GHRG model, parameters closer to the
root of T represent larger-scale structures in G and gov-
ern the likelihood of more edges. These parameters are
thus estimated with greater certainty, while the distri-
bution over parameters far from the root, representing
small-scale structures, have greater variance. This im-
plicit regularization prevents over-fitting to small-scale
structural variations and improves the inferred norm’s
robustness to noise.
IV. DETECTING CHANGE POINTS IN
NETWORKS
The final piece of our online network change-point de-
tection method is to determine whether and when the
parameters of our current model of “normal” connectiv-
ity have changed. To accomplish this, we use the pos-
terior Bayes factor over a sliding window of fixed length
w to detect if any changes have occurred with respect
to a GHRG model fitted over the window. A change is
detected if the factor exceeds a threshold determined by
a desired false positive rate.
A. Posterior Bayes factor
To determine whether or not we believe a change has
occured within a particular window we use the posterior
4Erdös-Rényi Graph Binary HRG
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FIG. 3: A spectrum of large-scale structure, corresponding to different amounts of hierarchy in the GHRG, ranging from a
simple random graph to a complete hierarchical organization.
Bayes factor [2]. Similar to a likelihood ratio test [3], but
consistent with our Bayesian framework, the posterior
Bayes factor is a ratio of the observed data’s likelihood
under two different models: a null hypothesis model H0,
in which no change occurs, and an alternative hypothesis
model H1, in which a change occurs at some particular
time tc. However, rather than evaluate the likelihoods
under maximium likelihood parameters, we use the pos-
terior marginal likelihood by weighting the average likeli-
hood by the posterior distribution. For the GHRG, this is
calculated by updating the prior hyperparameters (α, β)
in Eq. (3) with the posterior hyperparameters (α̂, β̂) in
Eq. (5).
We restrict our consideration of change points to those
within a sliding window of w networks, the last of which
is at the “current” time τ . We assume the change point tc
occurs between some pair of snapshots, which we indicate
using a 0.5 offset. For the no-change model, we say that
all networks within the window were drawn from a model
with parameters ψ(∅). For the change model, we let ψ(0)
denote the model parameters for networks up to tc within
our window and ψ(1) the parameters for networks after
tc, but still within the window. Rewriting the change
and no-change hypotheses in terms of such a shift in a
parametric distribution over graphs at tc, we have
H0 : ψ
(∅) = ψ(∅) (no change)
H1 : ψ
(0) 6= ψ(1) (change) .
Using ψ˜ = {α˜r, β˜r} to denote the set of posterior hy-
perparameters, the GHRG’s posterior Bayes factor for a
sequence of graphs {Gτ−w+1, ..., Gτ} is
Λt̂c =
t̂c−0.5∑
t=τ−w+1
log p(Gt |Tτ , ψ˜(0)t̂c )
+
τ∑
t=t̂c+0.5
log p(Gt |Tτ , ψ˜(1)t̂c )
−
τ∑
t=τ−w+1
log p(Gt |Tτ , ψ˜(∅)) ,
where ψ˜(∅) is the set of posterior hyperparameters per-
taining to the no-change hypothesis (no change point
anywhere in the window of w networks), while ψ˜
(0)
t̂c
and
ψ˜
(1)
t̂c
are the hyperparameters for the networks up to and
then following the point t̂c, respectively.
Finally, the time at which the change occurs tc is itself
an unknown value, and must be estimated. We make
the conservative choice, choosing t̂c as the time point
between a pair of consecutive networks that maximizes
our test statistic Λ across the window. Letting gτ for a
given window of w networks ending at τ be that largest
value
gτ = max
τ−w+1< t̂c<τ
Λt̂c , (6)
we then say that the time of detection td is the first time
point τ at which gτ exceeds a threshold h (called a “stop-
ping rule” in the change-point detection literature):
td = min{τ : gτ > h} . (7)
B. Parametric bootstrapping
The choice of threshold h, which gτ must exceed for
a detection to occur, sets the method’s resulting false
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FIG. 4: Taxonomy of change points: formation versus fragmentation and merging versus splitting. In each case, we show both
the block structure of the adjacency matrix for two groups and the corresponding GHRG model. For our experiments, we
switch from one structure to the other by changing the structural index µ. See text for more detail.
positive rate and the distribution of gτ under the null
model. Recent results on model comparison for statis-
tical models of networks, and specifically the stochastic
block model, of which the GHRG is a particularly useful
special case, suggest that for technical reasons the null
distribution can deviate substantially from the χ2 distri-
bution [25]. To avoid a misspecified test, we estimate the
null distribution numerically, via Monte Carlo samples
from a parametric bootstrap distribution [13] defined by
the GHRG for the no-change model. In this way, we
estimate the null distribution exactly, rather than via a
possibly misspecified approximation.
For each network we sample from the no-change GHRG
model and calculate gτ from Eq. (6) to obtain its distri-
bution under the hypothesis of no change (see Algorithm
1). Using the sampled distribution, the threshold h may
then be chosen so that p(gτ > h) = pfp is the desired
false positive rate. In practice we do this by calculating
a p-value for the test case by counting the proportion of
likelihood ratios in our null distribution that are higher
than our test statistic gτ :
p-value =
|{gτ}null > gτ |
|{gτ}null| . (8)
Thus, if we find a p-value below the chosen threshold, we
say a change is detected, and when the no-change model
is correct, we are incorrect no more than pfp of the time.
ALGORITHM 1: Parametric bootstrap sampling gτ from
the null model distribution
Input G = {G}ττ−w+1
{gτ}null = ∅.
GHRG(Tτ , ψ˜τ ) = fitGHRG(G).
for i = 1 to 1000 do
sample w graphs, {Gt}wt=1 ∼ GHRG(Tτ , ψ˜τ ).
for t˜c = 1 to w do
calculate ψ˜∅, ψ˜0, ψ˜1 according to Eq. (4) and Eq. (5).
Λt˜c =
∑t˜c−1
t=1 log p
(
Gt|Tτ , ψ˜(0)t˜c
)
+
∑w
t=t˜c
log p
(
Gt|Tτ , ψ˜(1)t˜c
)
−∑wt=1 log p(Gt|Tτ , ψ˜∅)
end for
g
(i)
τ = maxt˜c Λt˜c .
{gτ}null = {gτ}null + g(i)τ .
end for
V. DETECTABILITY OF CHANGE POINTS
Before applying our method to empirical data with un-
known structure and unknown change points, we first
systematically characterize the detectability of different
types of network change points under controlled circum-
stances on synthetic data, generated using our GHRG
model, with known structure and changes.
The following change-point types constitute difficult
but realistic tests that cover a broad variety of empiri-
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FIG. 5: Results for merge, split, fragment and form change points, where the size of the change is parameterized by the
structural index µ (orange line) and a discontinuity occurs at the true point of change. The resulting distributions of (top
row) estimated change points times t̂c (green bars), and (bottom row) detection times td (blue bars), for each change type.
The 0.5 time offset indicates that the estimated change point time t̂c occurs between a pair of consecutive network snapshots,
while td gives the time of the last network in the window when a detection event occurs. False detections (false positives)
occur when td < tc; no detection (false negatives) occur when τ − w + 1 > tc without a detection.
cally observed large-scale changes to network structure.
For our numerical tests, we choose network with N =30
vertices and a sparse and constant expected number of
connections (marginal link probability of 0.2). These
small networks provide a more difficult test case than
larger networks because the limited amount of data make
change points harder to detect since it becomes harder
to characterize the norms. Furthermore, we define four
general types of change points: splitting, when one large
community divides in two; merging, when two communi-
ties combine (the time-reversal of splitting); formation,
when one of two groups of vertices add edges to make a
community; and fragmentation, when one of two groups
loses all its edges (the time-reversal of formation).
Defining the structural index µ = pout /(pin + pout)
provides a single parameter that controls the switching
between these distinct states. For the merge/split change
points, we choose the merged state to be µ = 0.5, which
produces a single community in which every edge occurs
with the same probability pin = pout. In the split state,
the network is comprised of two distinct communities.
For formation/fragmentation change points, we use the
same two-community model, but now fix the link proba-
bility within one community and use µ to describe rela-
tionship between the pin and pout of the second commu-
nity.
We now summarize these change points with respect
to µ:
merge µ 6= 0.5→ µ = 0.5 fragment µ < 1→ µ = 1
split µ = 0.5→ µ 6= 0.5 form µ = 1→ µ < 1 .
All tests used a w = 4 window size and a 0.05 false-
positive rate. For comparison, we used three simpler ver-
sions of our probabilistic framework in which we replace
the generative model with a univariate Gaussian and con-
vert the network sequence into a time series of scalar val-
ues (mean degree, mean geodesic distance, mean local
clustering coefficient).
For each of the change types, Figure 5 shows two differ-
ent distributions (over 100 runs): the estimated change
point t̂c and the time of detection td (see Figure 1). We
find that the estimated change points tend to either be
correct or slightly early. The time of detection (the end
of the sliding window when a change is detected) quan-
tifies how many networks after the change we must see
before we identify the change point. We find that the
merge and fragment changes are detected quickly, while
their change points are often estimated early. In con-
trast, the split and formation changes are detected later,
while the estimation of the change points themselves is
more accurate.
In Figure 6 we compare the false positive and false
7FIG. 6: False negative (bottom) error rates for our method
and the simple methods on the four different change types
for different magnitudes of change(∆µ).
negative error rates among all four methods. On false
positives, all methods are close to 0.05, which matches
the desired false alarm rate. However, the false negative
rates differ widely, with the simple methods performing
terribly in nearly every case, even when the size of the
change is large. In contrast, our method performs well
across all four tests, except when the size of the change
is very small, e.g., when ∆µ ≈ 0, which represents the
hardest cases, where small-sample fluctuations obscure
much of the actual change. In the “split” and “merge”
experiments we notice that there seems to be a thresh-
old around which the detectability rapidly changes. In
these experiments, for changes of small magnitude, the
networks are close to Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph both
before and after the change point. It is likely then, that
this is related to the detectability phase transition known
to occur in the community detection problem [10].
VI. CHANGE POINTS IN REAL NETWORKS
We now apply these approaches1 to detect changes in
two high-resolution evolving networks, the MIT Reality
Mining proximity network2 [12] and the Enron email
network3 [16], for which a set of external “shocks” exists
that serve as targets for change-point detection. Both
data sets are evolving networks of human social interac-
tions, but represent different interaction types.
We quantify the performance in terms of precision and
recall as a function of the detection delay s between es-
1 Code for our method is available at http://tinyurl.com/
letopeel/code.html
2 realitycommons.media.mit.edu/realitymining.html
3 www.cs.cmu.edu/~enron/
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FIG. 7: Precision and recall of our method and the three
baseline methods at identifying known external events as a
function of delay (s).
timated change points {t̂c} and scheduled events {tc},
i.e.,
Precision(s) =
1
nc
∑
i
δ
(
inf
j
∣∣∣t̂(i)c − t(j)c ∣∣∣ ≤ s) (9)
Recall(s) =
1
na
∑
j
δ
(
inf
i
∣∣∣t̂(i)c − t(j)c ∣∣∣ ≤ s), (10)
where δ(x) is a delta function that equals 1 if x is true and
0 otherwise, and nc and na are the number of estimated
change points and actual events respectively. The pre-
cision is then the proportion of estimated change points
that occur within a given delay s of a known event. Sim-
ilarly, recall is the proportion of known events that occur
within a delay s of an estimated change point.
A. Social proximity network
The MIT network is comprised of proximity data for
97 faculty and graduate students, recorded continuously
via Bluetooth scans from their mobile phone over 35
weeks [12]. From the raw scan data, we extracted a
sequence of weekly networks, in which an edge denotes
physical proximity to one of the 97 subjects at some point
that week. Associated with the dataset are 16 known ex-
ternal events including public holidays, spring and winter
breaks, exam periods, etc [11].
For each detection method, the GHRG and the three
simple methods, we used a window size w = 4, the same
as in the synthetic experiments. The results for each
method are shown in Figure 7 (top). We see that cluster-
ing coefficient and mean degree slightly outperform our
approach in terms of precision, but our approach is much
better than all the baseline approaches at recall. Closer
examination of the change-points detected with each of
8the simple methods reveals that they exhibit low sensitiv-
ity relative to the known external events [11]. In partic-
ular, they do pick out several real change points, includ-
ing Winter break (mean geodesic distance), the begin-
ning (mean degree) and end (clustering coefficient) of the
independent activities period. However, they also miss
the majority of other events. In particular mean degree
and clustering coefficient only detect a total of 2 change
points, which explains the high precision scores. Fur-
thermore there is little consistency across these methods
(with the exception of the beginning of Sponsor week).
Thus, these techniques seem both unreliable and incon-
sistent.
In contrast, the GHRG method identifies nearly all of
the known external events, along with a few additional
change points, e.g., one week before and one week af-
ter Sponsor week. This fact agrees well with the so-
cial dynamics of Sponsor week, an event involving 75
of the subjects and which typically shifts work schedules
dramatically as they seek to meet deadlines and project
goals [11].
Additionally, the GHRG method finds more change
points in the Fall semester than in the Spring. Examin-
ing the dendrograms themselves, we find that the changes
in the inferred structures in the Fall are much more dra-
matic than in the Spring; see Figure 8 (top). This agrees
with the fact that 35 of the subjects were new students
in the Fall semester and thus still establishing their so-
cial patterns [11]. By the Spring semester, these pat-
terns had largely stabilized, and the large perturbation
of Sponsor week was absent. Overall, the GHRG both re-
covers known events, highlights additional changes, and
provides an interpretable basis for discovering new pat-
terns within this evolving network.
B. Enron email network
The Enron network is comprised of emails among 151
users, mostly senior management of the Enron energy
company. We identified a total of 25 events during the
3 year timeline. These data were made public by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission during its inves-
tigation after the company’s collapse. Using a cleaned
version of these data [16], we applied both the GHRG
and simple methods to weekly snapshots from May 1999
to June 2002.
Because this network sequence is very long, we ex-
amined the impact of varying window size, choosing
w = {4, 8, 16}. Results across window sizes were highly
consistent, although larger values produced additional
change points. This suggests that window size may op-
erate like a temporal resolution parameter, with longer
windows giving more resolution. The results for each
method are shown in Figure 7 (bottom) using a window
size w = 16.
The results for each method are shown in Figure 8
(bottom). As with the MIT network, we again find that
the simple methods perform poorly; the GHRG method
performs much better than all of them in both precision
and recall. Examining the GHRG change points and the
list of external events, we find that the identified change
points correlate well with key meetings and events such
share price fluctuations. Examining the inferred dendro-
grams, we find that a particularly large structural change
occurred around the launch of Enron online (Nov 1999).
Before its launch, the network’s structure is very sparse,
while after launch, the number of levels in the GHRG
model increase dramatically reflecting the formation of
many communities. We also see that the structure and
density of the networks increase over the period starting
immediately after the Californian blackouts through un-
til Stephen Cooper takes over as CEO and the collapse
of the company is imminent.
VII. DISCUSSION
When analyzing a sequence of time evolving networks,
a central goal is to understand how the network’s struc-
ture has changed over time, and how it might change in
the future. Change-point detection provides a principled
approach to this problem, by decomposing a potentially
non-stationary sequence of networks into subsequences of
distinct but probabilistically stationary structural pat-
terns. Here, we have presented the first change-point
detection method for evolving networks that utilizes gen-
erative network models and statistical hypothesis tests.
By formalizing this problem within a probabilistic frame-
work, we developed a statistically principled method that
can detect, in an online fashion, if, when and how such
change points occur in the large-scale patterns of interac-
tions. Under our framework, change points occur when
the shape of an estimated probability distribution over
networks changes significantly.
Not all such change points are equally easy to detect.
Using synthetic data with known structure and known
change points, we observed that only changes of a large
enough magnitude could be detected reliably. Further-
more, we found that changes associated with two commu-
nities merging or with one of several communities losing
its internal connections (“fragmentation”) were more dif-
ficult to accurately detect than those associated with one
community splitting in two or with many singletons con-
necting to form a new community (“formation”). This
asymmetry in the detectability of different types of net-
work changes begs the question of whether more sophis-
ticated techniques can eliminate these differences, and
whether adding auxiliary information like edge weights
[1] or vertex attributes [22] makes this problem easier or
harder.
That being said, change-point methods based on net-
work measures like the mean degree, clustering coeffi-
cient, or mean geodesic path length performed poorly,
yielding high false negative rates even for large struc-
tural changes (Fig. 6). This poor performance is likely
9FIG. 8: Change points detected in the MIT proximity (top) and Enron email (bottom) networks. Each figure showsthe change
points detected (green bars) using our method followed by the three simple methods (along with the values of the relevant
summary statistic). Known events are indicated by the colored vertical bars spanning all methods.
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FIG. 9: Time taken to infer GHRG for a window of 4
networks of varying size. Assumes sparse graphs, i.e., O(N)
edges.
the result of network measures discarding much of the
specific information that generative models utilize. Ap-
plied to two high-resolution evolving social networks, our
method provided very good results, recovering the tim-
ing, from network data alone, of many more known ex-
ternal “shock” events than the network-measure methods
(Fig. 7).
The computational burden of our current implementa-
tion lies in the MCMC procedure used to infer the hier-
archical structure (see Figure 9 for inference times). The
recent work of Ref. [7] proposes a greedy approach to in-
ferring a hierarchy that could naturally be used within
our change-point detection as a more scalable alternative.
However, it is important to understand what the trade-
off is between accuracy and scalability, and we believe
that this would be an interesting and useful direction for
future work.
Although the GHRG model yielded good results, in
principle, any generative model could be used in its place,
e.g., the stochastic block model [1, 15, 21] or the Kro-
necker product graph model [17]. Similarly, the recent
work in graph hypothesis testing [20] could potentially
be adapted to the change-point detection problem. Two
key features of the GHRG model for change-point detec-
tion, however, are its interpretability and the way it nat-
urally adapts its dendrogram structure to fit the network,
adding or removing levels in the hierarchy, as the network
evolves. Combined with the strong results on synthetic
and real-world data, this approach to change-point detec-
tion promises to have broad application, perhaps particu-
larly in social networks, where interpretability provides a
crucial bridge to testing hypotheses about the underlying
social dynamics driving network evolution.
VIII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank Dan Larremore for helpful conversations,
and acknowledge support from Grant #FA9550-12-1-
0432 from the U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific Research
(AFOSR) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA).
[1] C. Aicher, A. Z. Jacobs, and A. Clauset. Learning latent
block structure in weighted networks. Journal of Complex
Networks, 2014.
[2] M. Aitkin. Posterior bayes factors (with discussion).
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 53:111–142, 1991.
[3] M. Aitkin. The calibration of p-values, posterior Bayes
factors and the AIC from the posterior distribution of
the likelihood. Statistics and Computing, 7(4):253–261,
1997.
[4] L. Akoglu and C. Faloutsos. Event detection in time
series of mobile communication graphs. In 27th Army
Science Conference, Orlando, FL, USA, 2010.
[5] M. Basseville and I. V. Nikiforov. Detection of Abrupt
Changes: Theory and Application. Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA, 1993.
[6] M. Berlingerio, M. Coscia, F. Giannotti, A. Monreale,
and D. Pedreschi. Evolving networks: Eras and turning
points. Intelligent Data Analysis, 17(1):27–48, 2013.
[7] C. Blundell and Y. W. Teh. Bayesian hierarchical com-
munity discovery. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems 26, pages 1601–1609. 2013.
[8] D. Bryant. A classification of consensus methods for phy-
logenetics. In Bioconsensus, volume 61 of DIMACS Ser.
Discrete Math. Theoret. Comput. Sci., pages 163–183.
Amer. Math. Soc., Providence, RI, 2003.
[9] A. Clauset, C. Moore, and M. E. J. Newman. Structural
inference of hierarchies in networks. In E. Airoldi, D. M.
Blei, S. E. Fienberg, A. Goldenberg, E. P. Xing, and
A. X. Zheng, editors, Statistical Network Analysis: Mod-
els, Issues, and New Directions, volume 4503 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 1–13. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2007.
[10] A. Decelle, F. Krzakala, C. Moore, and L. Zdeborova´. In-
ference and phase transitions in the detection of modules
in sparse networks. Phys. Rev. Lett., 107:065701, Aug
2011.
[11] N. Eagle. Machine perception and learning of complex
social systems. Department of Media Arts and Sciences,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005.
[12] N. Eagle and A. Pentland. Reality mining: Sensing
complex social systems. Personal Ubiquitous Comput.,
10(4):255–268, Mar. 2006.
[13] B. Efron and R. J. Tibshirani. An introduction to the
bootstrap. Chapman and Hall, 1993.
[14] S. Hirose, K. Yamanishi, T. Nakata, and R. Fujimaki.
Network anomaly detection based on eigen equation com-
pression. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM SIGKDD Inter-
national Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data
Mining, KDD ’09, pages 1185–1194, New York, NY,
USA, 2009. ACM.
11
[15] P. W. Holland, K. B. Laskey, and S. Leinhardt. Stochas-
tic blockmodels: First steps. Social Networks, 5(2):109–
137, 1983.
[16] B. Klimt and Y. Yang. Introducing the Enron corpus.
In First Conference on Email and Anti-Spam (CEAS),
2004.
[17] J. Leskovec, D. Chakrabarti, J. Kleinberg, and C. Falout-
sos. Realistic, mathematically tractable graph genera-
tion and evolution, using Kronecker multiplication. In
Proceedings of the 9th European Conference on Princi-
ples and Practice of Knowledge Discovery in Databases,
PKDD’05, pages 133–145, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005.
Springer-Verlag.
[18] C. Le´vy-Leduc and F. Roueff. Detection and localization
of change-points in high-dimensional network traffic data.
The Annals of Applied Statistics, pages 637–662, 2009.
[19] I. McCulloh and K. M. Carley. Detecting change in longi-
tudinal social networks. Journal of Social Structure, 12,
2011.
[20] S. Moreno and J. Neville. Network hypothesis testing
using mixed Kronecker product graph models. In 13th
IEEE International Conference on Data Mining, 2013.
[21] K. Nowicki and T. A. B. Snijders. Estimation and Pre-
diction for Stochastic Blockstructures. Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 96(455), 2001.
[22] L. Peel. Topological feature based classification. In Pro-
ceedings of the 14th International Conference on Infor-
mation Fusion (FUSION), pages 1–8. IEEE, 2011.
[23] C. E. Priebe, J. M. Conroy, D. J. Marchette, and Y. Park.
Scan statistics on Enron graphs. Comput. Math. Organ.
Theory, 11(3):229–247, Oct. 2005.
[24] J. Sun, C. Faloutsos, S. Papadimitriou, and P. S.
Yu. Graphscope: Parameter-free mining of large time-
evolving graphs. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM
SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Dis-
covery and Data Mining, KDD ’07, pages 687–696, New
York, NY, USA, 2007. ACM.
[25] X. Yan, J. E. Jensen, F. Krzakala, C. Moore, C. R. Shal-
izi, L. Zdeborova´, P. Zhang, and Y. Zhu. Model selec-
tion for degree-corrected block models. arXiv, 1207.3994,
2012.
